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WHAT WE STILL DON’T KNOW ABOUT WHAT PERSUADES 






Over 25 years ago, in his foreword to the first volume of 
Legal Writing, Chris Rideout nailed it: legal writing as 
actually practiced by lawyers and judges needs to improve, 
“[b]ut more fundamental inquiry into legal writing . . . is 
needed as well.”1 The intervening decades have seen many 
laudable efforts on the latter front, as our collective scholarly 
discipline, then in its infancy, has matured. But one particular 
question that Rideout identified remains largely unaddressed 
by our discipline, although recent developments suggest a 
welcome increase in attention to the topic. Specifically, 
Rideout explained that our field did not know as much as we 
would like about how legal documents are “actually read.” His 
diagnosis was concise: “Much of the existing literature about 
legal writing . . . offer[s] fairly prescriptive advice about 
organization and style. Very little of this advice, however, is 
based on research into the ways in which legal documents are 
actually written or read. Rather, it largely depends upon time-
honored, general maxims for writing, translated into the 
language of legal writing . . . .”2 As all LRW professors know, 
legal writing in practice is by its nature often unavoidably 
complex both substantively and stylistically, making it 
imperative for the discipline to try to unpack those 
complexities to suss out what makes legal prose effective. To 
Rideout, it was “distressing” that we do not know – we in fact 
“need to know” – such matters as “what a judge responds to 
stylistically in a brief, or a client in reading an opinion letter, 
a will, or a contract.”3  
Do we know more now than we did then? Yes. Do we 
know as much as we could, or should? No. This holds for many 
aspects of legal writing, but my jumping-off point in this short 
essay is the specific topic of what rhetorical techniques 
actually persuade judges. A gap persists between what we 
think we know and what we actually do know about whether
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1 J. Christopher Rideout, Research and Writing about Legal 
Writing: A Foreword from the Editor, 1 LEG. WRITING v, v (1991). 
2 Id. at vi. 
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and, to a slightly lesser extent, how and why rhetoric 
influences judicial decisions. Below, I set out some quick and 
necessarily incomplete thoughts on why this actually is a 
problem worth addressing. I follow by identifying some holes 
in our knowledge that several scholars have started to try to 




As Rideout mentioned, much of what we teach our 
students about legal writing boils down to “time-honored, 
general maxims.”4 That observation, as applied to what 
students learn about persuasion, reflects the undeniable fact 
that many persuasive techniques stem in some way or another 
from the teaching of classical rhetoricians. Aristotle’s 
influential division of effective rhetoric into logos, ethos, and 
pathos is overtly acknowledged in many legal writing scholars’ 
works about advocacy,5 and implicitly underlies much if not 
most of the rest. Put simply, like the many generations before 
ours who have looked to the classical rhetoricians for 
guidance in how to construct powerful arguments, our field 
collectively believes that these approaches work.  
I’m no exception. Classical and current formulations of 
how to appeal to an audience’s sometimes-conflicting senses 
of justice, fair play, and naked self-interest correspond 
generally to my observations and personal and professional 
experience about how people make decisions in legal and non-
legal situations. The same holds for guidance framed in terms 
of reason and emotion, of syllogism and story and an 
advocate’s credibility. I teach my students accordingly.  
I’ve become less and less certain, however, sometimes as 
a result of insightful student questions, about how solid the 
foundation is for at least some of the techniques I encourage 
students to use. It’s not that I think a particular technique or 
rhetorical approach is ineffective or, worse, counter-
productive; if I did, I wouldn’t encourage students to use it.
                                                     
4 Id. 
5 E.g., RUTH ANNE ROBBINS, STEVE JOHANSEN, AND KEN CHESTEK, 
YOUR CLIENT’S STORY: PERSUASIVE LEGAL WRITING 23 (2013) (“The 
principles that [Aristotle] developed remain just as relevant today 
as they were at the time he was writing.”); Scott Fraley, A Primer on 
Essential Classical Rhetoric for Practicing Attorneys, 14 LEG. 
COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 99, 101 (2017) (“Indeed, a great many 
of the rhetorical concepts discussed herein infiltrate our everyday 
lexicon and usage, so that techniques like the ancient Greeks 
originated and taught may seem like second nature to some 
practitioners.”). 
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But I occasionally hesitate to justify my recommendations due 
to what seem to me to be ultimately unsatisfying rationales. 
For example, I might explain the reason(s) I or others believe 
a technique to be effective. Is this only a sophisticated “just 
so” story?  
Alternatively, I might explain that lots of commentators 
and experienced attorneys say that judges prefer particular 
techniques. Sometimes I can invoke judges themselves who 
say that about something or another. But this isn’t really a 
convincing reason. I of course believe judges who say they 
prefer a particular technique. Preference is a poor proxy, 
however, for whether using or not using a technique actually 
plays any role in shaping a judge’s decision. Judges, like 
anyone else, are often unaware of subtle influences on why 
they decide as they do; speaking broadly, legal realism 
suggests that their supposedly rational basis for making a 
decision may not be the actual basis for doing so, and in fact 
may be flatly at odds with that “real” reason.6 
To the extent my reactions are representative of other 
legal writing professors, two questions come to mind that I 
believe are likely shared by others. First, do these persuasive 
techniques actually have the claimed positive effect? Second, 
if so, why do they have that effect? 
 
Do Rhetorical Techniques Perform as Advertised? 
 
Properly answering the first question is largely a matter 
of empirical study, and in that sense both tracks and goes 
beyond one of the underpinnings of classical rhetoric. 
Aristotle’s and other classical rhetorical texts, like similar 
texts today, combine aspects of (among other things) 
observation and theory. As to the former, Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
is on one level a lengthy description of the techniques that 
advocates used in classical-era law courts and political fora, 
accompanied by observations about whether and when these 
techniques seemed to prove effective.
                                                     
6 This disconnect can lead to disturbing results. As one 
representative example, see Holger Spamann and Lars Klöhn, 
Justice Is Less Blind, and Less Legalistic, than We Thought: 
Evidence from an Experiment with Real Judges, 45 J. LEG. STUD. 
255, 270 (2016) (describing statistically significant results of an 
experiment in which actual judges were asked to make a ruling 
about a hypothetical criminal conviction, taking into account both 
a single precedent and either positive or negative facts about the 
defendant, and upheld the conviction of the unsympathetic 
defendant at a rate more than twice as high as that of the 
sympathetic defendant (87-41%)). 
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Modern scholars naturally can’t hope to replicate 
classical-era rhetoricians’ contemporaneous observations 
about what seemed to be persuasive millennia ago. But we can 
and should devote more attention to trying to determine 
empirically what seems to work now. Sophisticated statistical 
methods give us tools Aristotle didn’t have. These methods 
allow us to overcome the deficiencies of so-called “anecdata” 
by rigorously assessing whether and to what extent particular 
techniques actually do influence judges’ decisions.  
Several recent works by legal writing scholars exemplify 
the sort of analysis needed to start bringing some certainty to 
often-untested assumptions. The first, published in the 
current volume of this journal, examines whether a brief’s 
overall readability influences whether a party is likely to 
prevail on summary judgment.7 In their article, Shaun 
Spencer and Adam Feldman study a collection of briefs filed 
in state and federal courts, and conclude that “a statistically 
significant relationship [exists] between brief readability and 
the outcome of summary judgment motions.”8 They suggest 
potential explanations for their results,9 and identify 
additional research questions that their study poses.10 
In the second article, another survey of actual briefs, John 
Campbell set himself the task of measuring “whether there is 
a measurable relationship between writing style and 
winning.”11 Accordingly, he examined briefs from three 
appellate courts. His results, although not statistically 
significant, were consistent with the hypothesis that stylistic 
choices affect the chances of winning on appeal.12  
Finally, Ken Chestek designed an experiment to examine 
whether negativity bias – “the brain's natural inclination to 
attend to and process negative stimuli” – affected judges’ 
perceptions of a hypothetical case.13 Chestek created eight 
separate preliminary statements for a summary judgment 
brief, expressing either positive or negative themes, plus a
                                                     
7 Shaun B. Spencer & Adam Feldman, Words Count: The Empirical 
Relationship Between Brief Writing and Summary Judgment 
Success, 22 LEG. WRITING (2018). 
8 Id.  
9 Id. 
10 Id.  
11 John Campbell, Writing That Wins: An Empirical Study of 
Appellate Briefs, 46 COLO. LAW., no. 3, Mar. 2017, at 85. 
12 Id. at 87. 
13 Kenneth D. Chestek, Fear and Loathing in Persuasive Writing: 
An Empirical Study of the Effects of the Negativity Bias, 14 LEG. 
COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 1, 2 (2017). 
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neutral control.14 After reading one of the preliminary 
statements and some other materials, judges were asked 
which party they were inclined to favor.15 Results were mixed: 
“In some situations, negative themes seem to be important in 
priming a reader to disfavor the opposing party; in other 
situations negative themes backfire.”16 Chestek draws out 
various implications of his results, while recognizing that the 
artificial nature of his experiment limits how solid those 
implications are.17 
These articles start a discussion that more of us in the 
discipline of legal writing should join.18 They illustrate 
different ways of approaching the empirical uncertainty 
(measuring the results in actual cases versus carefully 
designed experiments) and attempt to assess both broad-
based and narrow rhetorical matters (readability, which 
draws in many different considerations, versus a specific 
emphasis on negative priming). They are properly cautious in 
the conclusions they draw, recognizing that their results 
might be explained for reasons other than those the authors 
propose, or believed to be likely before the study began. They 
leave open many further questions to be explored – not the 
least of which is replicating their results, an important though 
unglamorous part of any scientific inquiry. Future researchers 
may wish to design studies or experiments that attempt to 
drill down still further, measuring the impact of specific 
stylistic techniques.19 And, it bears emphasizing, none of these 
studies explain the causal connections that might be at work, 
or establish that such a relationship even exists. Finding a 
statistically significant correlation between a particular 
rhetorical measure and a positive (or negative) result doesn’t
                                                     
14 Id. at 15-16. 
15 Id. at 16-17. 
16 Id. at 2. 
17 Id. at 34-35. 
18 To be sure, earlier articles have empirically assessed whether 
judges or other legal readers prefer various stylistic options. See, for 
example, the sources cited in Spencer & Feldman, supra note 7. 
These results are useful starting points but in my view are subject 
to a flaw of any surveys of preferences in this setting: what readers 
say they prefer is not necessarily what actually persuades them. 
There are, of course, other reasons besides a direct impact on 
persuasion for advocates to structure their writing in line with their 
readers’ preferences.  
19 Following the lead of Lance N. Long & William F. Christensen, 
Clearly, Using Intensifiers Is Very Bad—Or Is It?, 45 ID. L. REV. 171 
(2008) (measuring the relationship between the use of intensifiers 
in appellate briefs and success on appeal). 
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imply causation. That something appears to work doesn’t 
explain why. 
 
Why Do Rhetorical Techniques Work? 
 
Instead, causation raises a different issue, the second 
question posed above: why these persuasive techniques 
appear to work. Returning to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, some of his 
theoretical explanation along these lines rested on positions 
about what it means to be human – man as a “rational 
animal,” for example – and what those positions suggested 
about why and how particular persuasive techniques would be 
expected to work. To put it gently, those assumptions are not 
widely accepted today in the light of some 2000-years’ worth 
of scientific advances. Alternate explanations are needed.  
LRW scholarship has made progress here, advancing the 
ball by beginning to explore the scientific underpinnings that 
help explain why various rhetorical techniques might have the 
effect that they do. A few examples: Kathryn Stanchi has 
explored a number of these topics in depth, such as her 
influential article that explores social science research on 
persuasion as applied to how legal advocates should present a 
court with negative information about their client or 
position.20 She and Linda Berger have recently published a 
textbook combining their interests in science and persuasion, 
setting themselves the ambitious goal of “unit[ing] persuasion 
science with rhetorical theory and the real-life practice of 
persuasion.”21 In doing so, they combine insights from both 
classical and contemporary rhetoricians with lessons from 
contemporary persuasion science, emphasizing cognitive and 
social psychology.22 Lucy Jewell has looked at classical 
rhetorical categories through the cognitive science lenses of 
categorization theory and information processing. From this 
investigation, she concludes that although classical categories 
don’t mirror how humans actually think, our belief that they
                                                     
20 See Kathryn M. Stanchi, Playing with Fire: The Science of 
Confronting Adverse Material in Legal Advocacy, 60 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 381 (2008). In another work, she draws lessons from cognitive 
science, and particularly the process of cognitive dissonance, to 
help advise lawyers about the tone they might wish to adopt in their 
advocacy – in other words, how hard they might want to push a 
position. See Kathryn M. Stanchi, What Cognitive Dissonance Tells 
Us about Tone in Persuasion, 22 J.L. POL’Y 93 (2013). 
21 LINDA L. BERGER & KATHRYN M. STANCHI, LEGAL PERSUASION: A 
RHETORICAL APPROACH TO THE SCIENCE 3 (2017). A review of the 
book appears in Volume 22. 
22 Id. at 7. 
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do “closely approximates how we best respond when complex 
information is presented to us.”23 
These works are models for how legal writing scholars 
might approach trying to provide a scientific grounding for 
legal writing. As Lance Long as observed, however, there’s not 
as much of this sort of scholarship as our discipline might 
wish. Indeed, he and Catherine Cameron have written a 
helpful textbook compiling scientific support for various 
aspects of legal writing, ranging from substantive reasoning to 
organization to style and even citation.24 But as Long later 
explained, the book didn’t contain as many purely legal 
writing studies as the authors had hoped, for the simple 
reason that there weren’t many such studies to include.25 
 
A Related Gap: The Connection Between Persuasion 
and Prediction 
 
Another reason for scholars to explore the sorts of topics 
addressed in this essay is that doing so might help us get a 
better handle on a deeper problem inherent in making 
predictions about anything related to legal decision-making. 
Work by Mark Osbeck delves into why accurately predicting 
the outcomes of legal disputes is so difficult.26 Our discipline 
emphasizes the importance of making accurate predictions – 
the first semester of many an LRW course is devoted to how 
lawyers communicate such predictions to supervisors and 
clients – but, as Osbeck explains, the impediments to doing so 
are surprisingly undertheorized in legal writing scholarship.27  
For example, studies conducted by academics in other 
fields reveal the persistent and systematic errors that 
professionals make when rendering predictions – errors that 
tend to put a thumb on the scales in favor of a client’s 
interests. Accountants overestimate the likelihood that
                                                     
23 Lucille A. Jewel, Old-School Rhetoric and New-School Cognitive 
Science: The Enduring Power of Logocentric Categories, 13 LEG. 
COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 39, 77 (2016).  
24 See CATHERINE J. CAMERON & LANCE N. LONG, THE SCIENCE 
BEHIND THE ART OF LEGAL WRITING (2015).  
25 Lance N. Long, Is There Any Science Behind the Art of Legal 
Writing?, 16 WYO. L REV 287, 287-88 (2016). 
26 Mark K. Osbeck, Using Data Analytics Tools to Supplement 
Traditional Research and Analysis in Forecasting Case Outcomes, 
20 LEG. WRITING 33, 34-35 (2015) (identifying factors that can skew 
predictions using traditional case analysis).    
27 See Mark K. Osbeck, Lawyer as Soothsayer: Exploring the 
Important Role of Outcome Prediction in the Practice of Law 2 
(February 4, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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financial measures will or will not pass muster, depending on 
whether they represent a hypothetical regulatory agency or 
reporting company.28 Doctors overestimate the time that 
terminal patients will likely survive.29 Similar studies about 
lawyers – by non-legal writing scholars – reach similar 
results: experienced attorneys overpredict the chances of a 
successful result in ways that mirror the position of their 
clients.30 Even law students get into the act: in moot court 
exercises, students randomly assigned to one side or the other 
tend to overpredict their hypothetical client’s odds of 
victory.31  
LRW professors recognize the biases that all lawyers (and 
all people) confront, of course; we acknowledge them in class 
discussions and instruct students how they might be able to 
reduce (although not wholly eliminate) the impact of such 
biases. Pedagogically, this serves our students well. From a 
scholarly perspective, though, one area that’s ripe for further 
exploration is trying to assess how the uncertainty in how 
judges make decisions intersects with the inevitable biases 
lawyers face in predicting those decisions, and what that 





Many LRW professors, myself included, might be 
interested in empirical work, but lack formal training in 
conducting such research. As Spencer says, empirical research 
                                                     
28 Don A. Moore et al., Auditor Independence, Conflict of Interest, 
and the Unconscious Intrusion of Bias 2 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working 
Paper No. 03-116, 2003), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c926/76e2a15c501512df3b3b8d
a5e9b3e918804f.pdf.  
29 Nicholas A. Christakis & Elizabeth B. Lamont, Extent and 
determinants of error in doctors' prognoses in terminally ill 
patients: prospective cohort study, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 369, 369 
(2000). 
30 Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ 
Ability to Predict Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL., PUB. POLICY & L. 
133, 133 (2010). 
31 Zev J. Eigen & Yair Listokin, Do Lawyers Really Believe Their 
Own Hype, and Should They? A Natural Experiment, 42 J. LEG. 
STUD. 239, 239 (2012). 
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isn’t easy.32 Naturally enough, this might appear to be an 
insurmountable obstacle to engaging in empirical work, 
especially when considering the already extensive demands 
on a professor’s time due to the heavy grading and other 
student-facing obligations of our courses. This position is 
completely understandable. In response, I’ll second Spencer’s 
encouragement that “[g]iven the talent and energy among 
legal writing faculty, we are well positioned to study what 
lawyers write, and the lawyers who read and write it.”33 And, 
much can be gained from reaching out to academics in other 
specialties who do have expertise in empirical work, 
potentially leading to interdisciplinary work that could reach 
a broader audience.34 Long sums up the point well: “If we 
want legal writing as a discipline to be taken seriously, we 
must be able to show, through rigorous studies, that we 
engage in serious legal writing scholarship.”35 Doing so, 
whether in response to Chris Rideout’s unanswered questions 
of 25 years ago or Long’s more recent challenge, can only 
benefit our collective scholarly community. 
                                                     
32 Shaun B. Spencer, Using Empirical Methods to Study Legal 
Writing, 20 LEG. WRITING 141, 141 (2015). His article contains 
much useful information for professors looking to learn more about 
how to make sense of empirical scholarship and/or conduct it 
themselves. I’ve relied on it myself in developing an ongoing project 
that tracks whether and how legal writing grades in a pass/fail 
setting correlate to success in other law school classes. 
33 Id. 
34 See id. at 183-84; Long, supra note 26, at 298 (“Legal writing and 
social science professionals need to corroborate to produce more 
quality legal writing-based empirical scholarship to better serve our 
law students and the legal profession generally.”). 
35 Long, supra note 26, at 297. 
